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Abstract:  
Political parties are essential elements of the political landscape in most of the world and their 
role is essential as they connect citizens to policy change. Though precisely because they do so 
much and mean so much there is little agreement among scholars on how they should be 
studied or understood. Indeed, despite the centrality of parties, the comprehensive large-N 
analysis of institutions and politics inside rather than among them is yet to be attempted. 
Instead, cross-national data collection efforts are mostly driven by theories that take party 
structures as given and focus on systems of parties and competition among parties in those 
systems. The basic question of why parties look like they do and how their organizational 
features affect political outcomes is left unasked. We believe that advancing scholarship 
demands that political scientists address the increasingly salient questions of source and 
purpose of the design of the formal and informal rules that define party organization—
intraparty institutions—and (further down the line) of the effects they have on politics and 
political outcomes. In this paper we introduce a theory-driven approach for empirically 
examining variation in internal party organization (i.e., rules) in cross-national as well as 
country-specific context. The gist of our measurement strategy is to trace the degree of 
centralization in intraparty resource flows. 
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1. Introduction 
In social sciences, much of the time, we are explaining social equilibria of some sort – by 
theorizing that those equilibria result from actors’ strategic responses as conditioned with 
rules of the game. This means, if one pauses to think it over, that state of the art in analysis 
of the effects of political structure and process essentially involves using institutions to 
explain institutions. This is so if we look to definitions, whereby consistent beliefs and 
expectations define both equilibria and institutions, and if we look to actual agendas of 
scholars in the field. Electoral rules, for example, are brought to bear to explain observed 
party unity, party systems, and party positions; or the structure of the executive is used to 
explain coalition structures, party systems, internal norms and regulations adopted by 
legislatures and cabinets. And everything institutional has at one point or another been 
used to explain the passage of laws---i.e., the adoption of policies, which at the end of the 
day are institutions in and of themselves.  
The reliance on institutions to explain institutions produces a conundrum. What we are able 
to say depends on where we decide to start. What we proclaim to be the cause is also the 
same thing that we assume to be given and fixed. In short, practically every piece of 
research can be automatically critiqued with the possibility of endogeneity in its theoretical 
argument. It is in this way that we often conceptualize parties and party systems.  We 
explain parties as an equilibrium combination of political strategies, and we say that 
institutions drive those strategies Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), Ordeshook and Shvetsova 
(1994). But then we see parties as actors exerting effort to manipulate to their advantage 
the same institutional variables which we code as explanatory for party system 
development (Andrews and Jackman 2005, Benoit 2002, 2007, Boix 1999, Shvetsova 1998, 
2003, Kinsey and Shvetsova 2008). Then there is the matter of treating parties and party 
systems themselves as a part of national institutional structure. Indeed, parties lie at the 
center of causes and effects, at least in democracies (or so we say). Parties also, and 
specifically of interest to us in this paper, make the very rules that affect their own 
structure, which makes it very difficult for observers to make generalizable arguments 
about causality. 
Thus, it is fair to say, that the progress of the field of party research as a whole, however 
impressive, is impeded in some aspects because of what the field recognizes as endogeneity 
in institutional explanations. When it comes down to explaining institutions with 
institutions, the field understandably encounters methodological confusion, logical 
conundrums, and reluctance to venture in certain research directions.  
It is at this point that we should probably explain our choice of a title. Endogeneity problem, 
including in institutional research, is sometimes referred to as the chicken-and-the-egg 
problem. But we think the Ouroborous is a superior animal analogy. While the egg and the 
chicken are two distinct entities contesting primacy and not coexistent, the institutions of 
parties and politics are not like that. The whole point is, it is hard to tell, where one ends 
and the other begins. Thus comes the Ouroborous, or the snake consuming its own tail. We 
prefer Ouroborous because of the way that it projects the sustained, on-going quality of 
mutual influence, being a single animal, however internally complex/conflicted. Also, as 
depicted, it does not exactly look like a snake but has legs, which also serves our purpose. 
This is because, substantively, our main thesis is that the political and party elites propel 
their interest forward by means of institutional design, whether it comes in the form of 
drafting a constitution, or designing party rules to make a collectivity to serve their private 
goals. Whether they choose election laws for their coalition to win, or organize their own 
coalition members just so, given their goals and the at-large political rules, the tiny legs are 
moving them forward at every step. The later part of the argument we explore below. 
  
2. Parties or Leaders?  
Internal organization of parties as strategic response to larger rules of the political game is 
one such difficult direction. How does one decide which institutions are part of the general 
political context and which are already the creatures of parties? What should we consider as 
falling in the range of strategic responses, particularly in view of the fact that it is parties 
that are behind the design and redesign of political institutions at large? 
In search of a fulcrum to anchor our theoretical structure, as well as the data work, we turn 
to the premise about the identity of the strategic actors behind “parties”. To assume actors 
also means to assume their preferences and thus to be able to look for traces of 
advantageousness to said actors within party rules and procedures. Our method thus can 
become: follow the money in reverse. If those who we think design party rules -- to optimize 
for their goals, given the larger institutional context, -- then we should observe what we can 
categorize as their preferred institutional regimes.  
Scholars tend to focus on political parties’ role as vehicles for collective action. Whether 
they are aggregating preferences, competing for office, or recruiting political elites, and so 
on, parties are seen as teams—collective endeavors for achieving collective goals. For 
scholars who worry about the potential disconnect between individual and collective goals, 
parties provide incentive structures designed to induce individuals to work in concert for 
their common interests. Individuals might join parties for their own purposes, but once 
inside they work for the party as much as the party works for them. The common 
perception of parties, in short, is that they channel individual desires to produce 
cooperation in pursuit of shared purpose. 
We are more interested in ways in which parties can serve as collective vehicles for 
individuals’ private objectives. While we agree that parties serve the various functions 
ascribed to them, we think it worthwhile to examine more closely the starting point—that 
parties are the means by which individual actors advance their self-interest in a context 
where achievement is possible only collectively. The issue is fundamental, since individual 
goals might overlap but are unlikely to match up straightforwardly, which means that it is 
vitally important who makes decisions for the party, and how. We thus start by asking how 
self-serving political elites—and here we define elites somewhat tautologically as those who 
design the rules that structure intraparty organization and decision making—would set up 
intraparty structure and process. Our basic premise is that parties are coalitions of 
politicians, and that these same politicians set up their coalitions’ internal rules. The 
decision to form (or join1) a party and the choice of intraparty rules both should serve 
rational politician-designers’ objectives.  
While historical institutionalists might carefully trace the evolution and growth of 
institutions, most empirical work takes institutions as given, discrete, and isolated. 
Measures of institutional context thus boil down to concrete variables, usually dummies---
bicameralism, presidentialism, PR versus SMD, and so on. But institutions are more than 
that. They both structure and embody decision-making structure and process, so that no 
institution in a given system ever is or can be independent from the others. Ultimately, 
institutions take the form of repeated or at least customary patterns of behavior that define 
a set of consistent, shared beliefs and expectations. To capture this dynamic, continuous 
aspect of political institutions, we measure them as elements of process. 
Table 1 shows four different types of party-defined actors (in the rows) and (in the 
columns) four distinct elements of utility provided to them by their chosen party. A plus 
sign in a cell indicates that the actor in the relevant row gains utility from the party-
                                                        
1 We do not address individual politicians’ decisions to affiliate with a party here. 
The question is interesting, and we each have dipped our ties into the rapidly growing 
literature on choice and change in politicians’ partisanship (Heller and Mershon 2005; 
2008; 2009; Mershon and Shvetsova 2008; 2009), but it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  
delivered utility element in the column. We make no particular claims at this point with 
respect to how actors might weight the different benefits. On the whole, Table 1 suggests 
that different types of agent within a party would design intraparty rules geared to achieve 
different objectives—which in turn implies that different agents would produce different 
designs. We address the question of whether, how, and under what circumstances different 
agent types would produce different designs in a larger project. As a first step, it is 
important to ascertain the basic connection between the agents and the bias in the design, 
which constitutes our main underlying theoretical premise. We thus start with the 
maintained hypothesis that party rules are designed by a set of ambitious actors whom we 
define as party elites. This hypothesis dictates our case selection: we include only party 
systems where we believe it obtains. Party elites can of course be constrained—by voters, 
by party activists, or by party rank and file—but we abstract away from these sources of 
variation in order to focus on the effect of “macro” (i.e., primarily constitutional) 
institutional variables on elite goals and consequent party-design outcomes.  
Table 1. Elements of Objective Function by Party Agent  
 Benefits 
Actors Party Policy Party Activities Salary and 
Office 
Ambition/Career 
Voters +    
Activists + +   
Rank and 
file 
+ + +  
“Elites” + + + + 
 
The columns in Table 1 identify broad categories, but are instructive nonetheless. For most 
students of political parties, the objective of interest is primarily electoral and confined to 
the first column in the table: individuals, from voters to party elites, want their party to win 
elections and implement its policy program. Whether the primary concern is the details of 
party positioning and party systems (Duverger 1954), the regional-national tension that 
parties have to embrace to succeed in federal systems (cf. Boleyer 2011; Carty 2004), or 
internal party organization (see, e.g., Panebianco 1988; Samuels and Shugart 2010), 
leadership recruitment (Kam et al. 2010; Norris 1997), or party unity (see, e.g., Bowler, 
Farrell, and Katz 1999; Kam 2009; Sartori 1994; Laver 2006), behavior is seen through the 
lens of electoral efficacy (see Sartori 1976).  With few exceptions (albeit with a venerable 
history, beginning at least with Michels 1911), the possibility that something else might be 
going on inside parties—that individuals might be fighting to further their own interests 
rather than their view of the collective interest of the party and its members—is left to one 
side (but see in particular Strøm 1994). Even where the party in office is understood to have 
interests different from the people who vote for them (Katz and Mair 1995; Kitschelt 1989), 
the focus tends to remain solidly on winning elections. 
We approach the question of how a party organizes differently. We do not quarrel with the 
notion that winning elections is important—after all, under normal circumstances not only 
do the members of a party that does poorly in elections gain no benefit from policy, but they 
also gain little from any of the other benefits of legislative service—but rather argue that for 
elites there might be an important difference between winning and doing “well enough.” 
The key point of Table 1 is that different party agents have different sets of goals, some of 
which they hold in common and some of which they do not.  As long as whoever designs 
party rules assigns positive weights to their own possible benefits, they have reason to 
  
create party institutions that help them to ensure that the party reflects their interests (cf. 
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; 1989). Conflicts of interest among different classes of 
party members (or affiliates, or agents) therefore are intrinsic to any party that can hope 
realistically to play the legislative policy-making game, which implies that all parties are 
born with the original sin of agency loss. 
Moving into the second column of Table 1, policy still looms large. Party activities distinct 
from campaign build team sentiment and loyalty, giving the activists who do the hard 
footwork necessary to get voters to the polls a reward above and beyond whatever policy 
influence the party gains (though party policy still ought to be important to activists). Past 
the second column of the table, however, policy starts to look less like an objective and 
more like an instrument. Elected party members and elites benefit privately from holding 
office, no matter who ends up determining policy, and it seems reasonable to suppose that 
they might be tempted to trade their own (incumbents’) self-interest against the desires of 
voters and activists alike (Katz and Mair 1995).2 In column 3, the disconnect is not 
complete: as long as the perks of office can be gained only by winning elections, and as long 
as propounding party policy helps to win elections, then a politician who cares a great deal 
about holding office and taking home the associated paycheck still ought to evince more 
than passing interest in policy making (cf. Heller and Mershon 2008). Column 4, by contrast, 
is problematic. If elites can realize (or seek to realize) their personal ambitions at the 
expense of party policy or electoral success (e.g., by negotiating policy compromises in 
order to enter government), or if their careers are close to ending (Strøm 1994), then they 
might be willing to sacrifice the interests of the party and everyone else in it in order to 
serve their own interests. 
For present purposes we leave the exact definition of who belongs in the party elite 
ambiguous, beyond the self-referential definition above. This ambiguity is realistic, as elite 
status is determined less by an individual’s formal status than by her position in informal 
political and personal networks. The tautology also is realistic, as elite status is endogenous: 
one can acquire power by applying power, so those who design rules to their own 
advantage accumulate benefits and advantages and grow to become privileged party 
members. They then can sustain their status by further amending rules when external 
circumstances change. As long as elites—who, at the end of the day, turn out to be those 
individuals whose expressed preferences influence what their parties do—understand what 
they need to do in the interests of holding on to or accumulating influence (an assumption 
that holds across a wide range of political-science literature; cf. Boix ; Mayhew 1974), it is 
hard to escape the conclusion that whoever designs a party’s rules should wield 
disproportionate influence within the party. (A more precise definition of what it takes to be 
one of the elite would no doubt be useful, but is unnecessary for this paper.) The starting 
point, then, is that there exist individuals both who are in a position to weigh in on the 
choice of internal party rules and whose utility functions might include some party-related 
benefits above and beyond winning seats and making policy. To reiterate: this is not to say 
that party elites do not share goals—i.e., winning elections and making policy—with their 
copartisans. Rather, the politicians who comprise a party’s elite echelons derive additional, 
private goods from or associated with the process of producing the public good of policy 
(and electoral success) for the other agents in their party.  
Another matter of definitions that we need to clarify at this point is the nature of party 
rules. We focus here on rules that we expect parties that share institutional context to hold 
in common. Some such rules that are imposed on parties by the constitution or by statue 
(see, e.g., Janda 2005), while others emerge in common as optimal responses by elites in 
similar circumstances. Parties also generally have internal rules that their in-system 
counterparts do not share, of course. Some of these rules make sense in light of similarities 
                                                        
2 This also fits the intuition underpinning arguments for a “norm of universalism” in 
the US Congress (see, e.g., Weingast 1979). 
  
or differences in in parties’ natural constituencies or other characteristics—we expect 
power in left parties to be generically more concentrated than in right parties, for 
example—while others probably are purely idiosyncratic. We abstract away from 
unpredictable differences in order to focus on rules that apply to parties throughout the 
party system, in line with the important observation that where parties make the rules (and 
party elites determine what their parties want), party laws that affect all parties are just as 
much the product of elite design (they are a product of joint efforts of party elites from 
different parties) as the internal rules that each party determines on its own. Our focus on 
the variation in rules due to the variation in regime-defining macro institutions allows us to 
embrace these jointly designed items. If anything, this should carry the bias against our 
argument – broadening the set of immediate designers might introduce additional 
constraints and suppress the reflection of the elite goals in the outcome.3  
At the most abstract level and as a gross oversimplification, our argument is as follows: 
Party elites want more than electorally optimal power-concentrating and less than 
electorally optimal power-diffusing rules and practices in a party; the rest of party actors 
want exactly electorally optimal power-concentrating and power-diffusing institutions. 
Party elites design the rules, subject to the constraint of remaining reasonably electorally 
successful, yet willing to introduce a partial trade-off between the electoral and policy 
success on the one hand and their own career security on the other and push for greater 
than optimal intraparty concentration of power. The reason why elites value concentrated 
power is because that prevents obstacles from rising in the way of their careers (e.g., in the 
form of grass-roots backed maverick bidders for party positions). 
The value of elite career opportunities varies across systems. This variation, starting with 
the simple truism that what is defined as “reasonable” electoral success differs depending 
on the electoral system. In some systems—SMD plurality rules are the case in point—a bare 
minimum of electoral achievement requires much greater diffusion of power than in others, 
other things equal. Moreover, imperfect agency always carries a risk, e.g., that lower-level 
agents or the party’s erstwhile principals might discover the extent of their agency loss, 
possibly with help from rival elites, and thus carries an inherent, if not always realized, cost. 
Hence, absent tangible rewards at the end of the road—e.g., absent a list of ministerial 
portfolios or other career targets made available by the constitution—elites should be less 
interested and thus should expend less effort in concentrating power through institutional 
design. These and similar considerations lead clear hypotheses and expectations with 
regard to how might expect elite incentives to vary across systems and, consequently, the 
patterns that might exist in the data. At this early stage—we are, as far as we know, 
breaking new ground with this research—they also inform our approach to case selection. 
Our main hypothesis connects the constitutionally provided opportunity structure for party 
elites with the outcomes of institutional design with respect to parties’ internal operation: 
H1:  Party elites should design party rules in the direction of greater concentration of 
power when there are party-controlled benefits at stake beyond legislative office, other 
things equal. 
Stated more specifically, and aligned with our data strategy, we rephrase this hypothesis as: 
H1a:  Party elites should design party rules in the direction of greater concentration of 
power in parliamentary as compared to presidential systems, other things equal. 
We do the same on the side of power diffusion:  
                                                        
3 If we are right, party laws that dictate how parties must (or must not) organize are 
tantamount (where such rules concentrate power in elite hands or facilitate incuments’ 
reelection) to an elite or incumbent conspiracy. Those in power pass laws making it easier 
to stay in power, but because the rules apply as well to their counterparts on both sides of 
the political spectrum the associated agency loss is less noticeable. 
  
H2:  Party elites should design party rules in the direction of less diffusion of power 
when there are party-controlled benefits beyond legislative office to be gained, other things 
equal. 
H2a:  Party elites would design party rules in the direction of less diffusion of power in 
parliamentary systems as compared to presidential, other things equal 
Hypotheses H1a and H2a reflect our theoretical belief that there exists some optimal design 
for party electoral success in a given electoral system, in a given type of state (e.g., federal or 
unitary), and in a given type of a party (e.g., a party of the poor or a party of the wealthy). A 
parliamentary form of government, where cabinet and prime-ministerial aspirations add a 
layer of strongly felt elite incentives, will distort this optimal design relative to non-
parliamentary (presidential) systems. That is, we expect power in parties to be generically 
more concentrated in parliamentary than in presidential systems, whatever the electoral 
system. In light of our expectations, we adopt the most-different-systems research design 
presented in Table 2.  
Table 2. Main independent variable and controls influence on the presence of power-
concentrating intra-party institutions  
   Parliamentary + Presidential - 
Federal 
- 
SMD 
- 
Left + --++ Australia --+- USA 
Right  - ---+ Australia ----    USA 
PR 
+ 
Left -++ Spain -+- Argentina 
Right -++ Spain -+- Argentina 
Unitary 
+ 
SMD 
- 
Left + +-++ UK +-+- 
Right - +--+ UK +--- 
PR 
+ 
Left +++ Norway ++- Taiwan 
Right- +++ Norway ++- Taiwan 
Single member district campaigns require power-diffusing rules not just for successfully 
winning individual constituencies, but also in order to win enough of them to have a shot at 
policy control. Thus, compared to PR systems, we expect more power-diffusing and less 
power concentrating design features under SMD. Federal versus unitary polities should 
similarly have more power-diffusing party rules. Taking seriously the sociological approach 
to party organization, it follows that money should be in short supply for parties of the left, 
which thus should be designed with tighter and relatively more power-concentrating 
budgetary and campaign rules than parties of the right (though there could be a number of 
reasons why the opposite can be the case as well).  
We build our research design around the variation in our key independent variable, 
parliamentarism. The idea is to compare parties in parliamentary versus presidential across 
every possible category of controls. (The important controls from our perspective are 
elements that are theoretically linked to party power concentration independent of the 
constitutional system.) Our case selection thus aims at maximizing the constitutional 
differences among the country-cases. Within countries, we also compare across parties that 
represent different sides of the ideological spectrum, following up on the hypothesis 
advanced by the sociological theories. Table 3 summarizes our expectations and outlines 
our case selection. 
It is worth noting at this juncture that the design of electoral rules can be closely linked to 
the interests of the parties involved in creating them. Evidence from post-Communist 
eastern Europe supports a nice theoretical story (Buliga-Stoian 2009) that pits unorganized 
  
parties with clear, attractive labels (opposition parties) against well-organized parties 
whose labels are repugnant to many (the former ruling Communist parties). Where the 
former Communists were able to influence outcomes, electoral rules tilted toward 
candidate-centered voting; where opposition parties had the bargaining advantage, they 
instituted party-oriented systems where a strong label was particularly beneficial.4 It seems 
reasonable that the same kinds of self-serving concerns that determine choice of electoral 
rules should hold sway in the design of intraparty rules as well.  
3. Measuring the Dependent Variable: Intraparty Institutions  
How can we measure the concentration of power in parties? The problem is twofold. First, 
claims about what the distribution of power should be, as defined in party laws (Janda 
2005) and party rules, do not necessarily reflect the reality of what the distribution of 
power in fact is. Consider, for example, a constitutional stipulation—found in many national 
constitutions around the world—that the legislative mandate exercised by individual 
legislators should be free from outside pressures;  not only are outside pressures 
commonplace, coming at the very least from parties, voters, and interest groups, but to the 
extent that being able to exercise the mandate freely requires breaking ties between 
legislators and their parties or their constituents the constitutional stipulation is 
incompatible with democracy.  
The second part of the problem is that it is difficult (and probably impossible) to infer 
authority from behavior. When individuals or organizational units in a political party take 
action (e.g., adopting some policy stance or running a political campaign), they might be 
implementing their own preferences under their own volition. They also might be carrying 
out the wishes of someone else—e.g., constituents, donors, higher-level leaders, candidate-
nominating activists. Our solution to the problem is to look for resource flows within 
parties. The idea is that control over resources confers independence, while dependence on 
transfers from resource holders—be they party leaders at the top of the party hierarchy or 
rank-and-file members with their own funding sources—will make recipients of said 
transfers highly attentive to the desires of the resource holders. Hence, a party leader who 
nominally is the agent of the party’s rank and file but controls valuable resources for the 
fulfillment of members’ career ambitions effectively is their de facto principal. Observed 
behavior might be uninformative or even misleading, but resource flows reveal more than 
they hide. 
In order to trace principal-agent relationships, then, we seek to identify and follow 
intraparty resource flows. The resources we are interested in are three: resources and 
remunerations for normal expenditures (e.g. ., legislator salaries, office, staff, housing, 
travel, etc.), control over career prospects (e.g., access to the ballot and career 
advancement), and campaign finance. Some of the resources we look at are governed by 
statute and so do not vary within countries; others are governed by party rules, making 
interparty differences possible (albeit not necessary). Of course, the statutes in question are 
created by parties (cf. Pérez-Francesch 2009, 252), but the political and practical 
considerations contributing to party law likely are more complex than those governing 
party-decisions on their own organization. At the end of the day, we believe, what 
determines the structure of principal-agent relationships within a party is not the fine detail 
but rather control over resources in the aggregate. 
As a first cut at measuring the balance of power inside parties as measured by resource 
flows, we ask a number of questions about control over different types of resources at 
                                                        
4 This also is consistent with the story of the choice of electoral rules in post-war 
Italy, where the uncertainty of the parties in the “arco costituzionale” about their popular 
support led them to implement a highly proportional system. 
  
different levels inside parties.  The questions, along with some thoughts about why they are 
important and how they relate to the concentration or diffusion of power, are listed below. 
We do not run two separate taps for the concentrating and diffusing institutions, since 
identifiable rules that in different ways regulate the same aspect of party functioning often 
do so to different effect and we opt against discussion the same aspects in different places. 
The summary table in Appendix identifies power-concentration as “+”, and power-diffusion 
as ”-.“  
• Top down transfers: If lower-level units within a party depend on resource transfers 
from higher levels, that should concentrate power by making lower levels 
dependent on the good will of higher-level elites. 
• Voluntary bottom-up transfers: If lower-level units have their own resources and 
can—but need not—transfer some of their wealth upward, that makes higher levels 
dependent on lower levels for resources. Consequently, voluntary bottom-up 
transfers indicate decentralization of authority. 
• Mandatory bottom-up transfers: If lower-level units have their own resources but 
are required to pass some on to higher levels, we see that as indicative of power 
concentration on two fronts. First, mandatory upward flows can only occur where 
the central authority has the ability to force lower levels to surrender their 
resources; and second, upward flows give the top levels of the party access to a 
greater share of all-party resources than they otherwise would have. 
• Where resources are received or expended below the electoral-district level—e.g., 
by individual candidates—we believe power should be less concentrated, all else 
equal. At heart, the movement of resources at the bottom of the party organizational 
pyramid suggests a need to adjust to local circumstances, likely rendering the 
concentrated exercise of authority inefficient or counterproductive. 
• If campaign funds are held and expended separately from funds in the general party 
budget, as in the case of PACs in the US, there is likely to be a separation of purpose 
between campaigns and the intraelectoral concerns of party leaders. Even if the 
same people are in charge in both cases, the objectives are different enough to give 
rise to conflicts between them. We thus take such separation of budgets as 
indicative of dispersion of power. 
• Government funding of legislative parties is a direct transfer to the top levels in 
parties, hence supports the concentration of power. 
• Government funds to candidates to fund campaigns provides the recipients with a 
degree of financial independence that undermines the concentration of power. 
• Tithing to the central party organization by sitting legislators, as in the case where 
lower-level units of the party are obliged to transfer resources upward, indicates 
power concentration. 
  
• If local organizations cannot register under a party label without the consent of 
higher-level party officials, that indicates a concentration of power. The party label 
is a key resource, and limits on local-level registration indicate that it is a resource 
controlled by the party center. 
• Government funding of parties (as opposed to candidates) for elections indicates 
power concentration, since candidates who fail to serve the interests of the party—
as determined by higher-level officials—can expect to see fewer party resources 
funneled their way. 
• Where top levels of the party can deny use of the party label to specific actors or 
groups (e.g., candidates nominated to the ballot by local party organizations), those 
actors depend on the good will of higher-level elites. Power thus is more 
concentrated. 
• Where independents can run for office or serve in the legislature, individuals within 
parties have a viable outside option vis-à-vis toeing the party line. Such an option 
should give them the ability to resist directives from on high, hence contributing to 
the dispersion of power. 
• Where access to media outlets is provided free by law to candidates, hence 
removing one of the key funding demands on campaigns, candidates depend less on 
party resources than they otherwise would. Such access therefore contributes to the 
dispersion of power. 
• Similarly, legal rational of media access makes it more difficult for top levels of a 
party to allocate media resources as they see fit, thus contributing to the dispersion 
of power. 
• Where media access is rationed, but party elites determine the distribution of their 
party’s allocation, power is more concentrated. 
• If legislators have offices and staff by virtue of the office they hold, independent of 
party, they are thus relatively independent of the party, all else equal. To the extent 
that such resources are not controlled by parties, therefore, power is dispersed. 
• Similarly, if legislators have independent budgets by virtue of holding a seat and not 
under the control of their party, they can act independently without risking at least 
some portion of the resources available to them. Independent budgets thus 
undermine the concentration of power. 
• Where parties pay allowances to their legislators—whether their entire 
remuneration or some sort of top-up funding—they have a fairly big club to hold 
over legislators’ heads. Such allowances thus indicate a concentration of power. 
  
• The explicit recognition of party factions in party rules indicates, somewhat 
counterintuitively, power concentration. Basically, we see formally recognized 
factions as serving the central-party interests on two levels. First, they create an 
orderly competition for control over the party, but do not necessarily require the 
dispersion of authority otherwise; and second, the existence of factions provides 
leaders with information about party-member preferences that they can use in 
deciding whom to promote, hence improving central-party authorities’ ability to 
control public perceptions of the party (cf. Weiwei’s diss). 
• Legislative primaries remove higher-level officials’ control over ballot access, hence 
reducing the concentration of power. 
• If peak organizations (such as labor unions or manufacturer associations) can 
donate directly to or campaign for parties, power is concentrated to the extent that 
party leaders build relationships with those organizations. 
• Where the party leader is chosen by sitting legislators, the effect is twofold. On one 
hand, this selection concentrates power in the hands of sitting legislators; on the 
other hand, it makes the leader the clear agent of said legislators, who thus can 
expect to exert influence that they could not were the leader selected by conferees 
at a party congress. 
• If the selection of party leader is separate from selection of the party candidate for 
chief executive (i.e., Prime Minister or President), power is less concentrated. Where 
both positions end up in the hands of different individuals, obviously, party 
decisions are the outcome of a bargaining process. Power might be centralized, but 
it is not concentrated. Where the same individual ends up holding both positions, on 
the other hand, it might be easier for rank and file members to threaten removal 
from one or the other, hence holding a rein on the leaders’ authority. In both cases, 
therefore, separate selection suggests less concentration of power. 
4. Theoretical value of our process-based approach to operationalization of 
party institutional choice 
Our theoretical approach is novel in that it conceptualizes organizational choices as 
mechanisms—tools meant to serve their designers’ purpose. As we see it, this perspective 
absorbs the two major existing schools of thought on intraparty institutions, which 
currently are at odds with each other. The socio-economic approach, traditional in the 
literature on European parties and party systems, links party structure to the optimization 
of resource allocation for campaigns and elections. Following this approach, divergent 
organizational strategies across parties stem from differences in the social organization and 
economic status of their core constituencies. It follows from this line of reasoning that 
parties that adhere to similar ideologies—and hence serve similar constituencies—should 
  
share organizational patterns across countries, while socioeconomic differences in party 
constituencies should drive differences in party organizations within states.  
The traditional, Eurocentric approach to the study of parties clashes with the modern 
emphasis, developed primarily among students of the US Congress, on the role of 
institutions in defining fundamental incentives and constraints for political action. From 
this institution-centric perspective, similarities in parties’ institutional contexts should lead 
to convergence in design outcomes. It follows that party organizations within states, subject 
to the same electoral rules and working within the same framework of institutional 
constraints and incentives, should look alike, while inter-country differences in institutional 
structure should be linked to variation in party structures. Thus, the institutional school 
generates expectations generally contrary to those of the socio-economic school. As for 
theoretical models, scholars working within this line of research are compartmentalized by 
the aspect of institutional influence that they choose to explore. One angle, for example, is to 
focus on the mechanical constraints that decision-making structure and process impose on 
agents and how agents organize to overcome those constraints. First-past-the-post electoral 
rules, for example, bias outcomes in favor of single-party legislative majorities, thus 
obviating or at least minimizing the need for parties to create and maintain mechanisms 
both for bargaining with other parties and for negotiating and maintaining intraparty 
support for interparty agreements. Proportional systems, by contrast, with their propensity 
to yield indecisive electoral outcomes (i.e., no single party holds a majority of legislative 
seats), force parties to consider legislative outcomes as interparty bargains. A second line of 
attack in the institutional camp is to identify the path to agenda control defined by formal 
legislative and constitutional rules (which set, for example, the number and relative 
authorities of different branches of government) and posit that party elites design party 
organizational forms to maximize their ability to control the agenda. 
At the end of the day, the question of which approach—socio-economic or institutional—is 
better for understanding party organization should be an empirical one. In part because the 
two approaches are insulated from each other, however, the data gathered by advocates of 
one are of little use for testing hypotheses generated by advocates of the other. Data 
collection in both camps is spurred by theoretical considerations, but the focus of each is so 
different that their dependent variables (often qualitatively defined) end up doing little 
more than reflecting and validating the motivating theory. Neither of the approaches in the 
institutional tradition generates clear hypotheses about how parties should organize. 
Arguably, the socioeconomic school does yield such hypotheses; it does not, however, spell 
out the mechanisms by which party elites make specific organizational choices, thus 
preventing the useful incorporation of institutional variables to account for variation in 
incentive structures. The problem as we see it is that both perspectives are incomplete. 
While both assume (though the socio-economic only implicitly) that parties want to win 
elections or gain policy, this assumption essentially equates the goals of the decision-
makers with those of the party. What in needed instead, and what this paper  is intended to 
provide, is a general theory that gives pride of place to principal-agent relationships inside 
parties. 
5. Findings 
Table 3 reports the prevalence of power-concentrating institutions in the total set of those 
that we record for each party in the dataset (Appendix 2 lists political parties that 
correspond to the entries in the hypothesis table). The test of H1a consists in identifying 
statistically significant differences in the prevalence of power concentrating rules in 
parliamentary versus presidential party-equivalents. Considering that we have a missing 
theoretical category of unitary/SMD/presidential, we do not have a meaningful comparison 
for the two UK cases. Those comparisons, however, are available for the other six, of which 
in four (federal/SMD and unitary/PR) we do observe statistically significant difference in 
  
the expected direction. Spanish parties are the outliers and are not regulated towards 
statistically significantly greater power concentration relative to their Argentinian 
counterparts. (Or, alternatively, Argentinian parties are more centralized than might be 
expected.) 
Table 3. Prevalence of power-concentrating intra-party institutions  
   Parliamentary + Presidential - 
Federal 
- 
SMD 
- 
Left + --++ Australia  .55 --+-  USA  .22 
Right  
- 
---+ Australia   .33 ----    .13 
PR 
+ 
Left -++ Spain  .53 -+- Argentina .55 
Right -++ Spain .53 -+- Argentina .58 
Unitary 
+ 
SMD 
- 
Left + +-++ UK  .5 +-+- 
Right - +--+ UK .4 +--- 
PR 
+ 
Left +++ Norway   .67 ++- Taiwan .38 
Right +++ Norway  .63 ++- Taiwan .38 
 
Table 4 summarizes the same statistics in a different way, as we continue our search for the 
better way to operationalize our dependent variable, and presents what we call an index of 
intra-party institutional concentration (IIIC). IIIC is calculated as a ratio of power 
concentrating to power diffusing rules and is another way to reflect the balance between 
the two types. Anything below 1 is tilted towards power-diffusion, values above 1 indicate 
bias in the direction of power-concentration. Notice here that this is in no way an indication 
of how diffused or concentrated parties are – IIIC characterizes rules, constraints, which 
may be put in place exactly for the purpose of overcoming the otherwise prevailing 
tendency in party development. Again, for the four federal/SMD and unitary/PR pairs of 
party-cases we observe statistically significant differences in IIIC in the expected direction. 
Spanish and Argentinian counterparts, however, appear to be regulated in very similar 
ways. 
Table 4. Index of institutional concentration  
   Parliamentary + Presidential - 
Federal 
- 
SMD 
- 
Left + --++ Australia 1.2 --+-  USA  .3 
Right  
- 
---+ Australia     .5 ----    USA  .1 
PR 
+ 
Left -++ Spain  1.1 -+- Argentina 1.2 
Right -++ Spain 1.1 -+- Argentina 1.4 
Unitary 
+ 
SMD 
- 
Left + +-++ UK        1 +-+- 
Right - +--+ UK     .7 +--- 
PR Left +++ Norway     2.0 ++- Taiwan   .6 
  
+ Right +++ Norway    1.7 ++- Taiwan     .6 
 
This similarity between the cases of Spain and Argentina goes away when we focus on an 
indicator which is hidden in the computation of both the IIIC and the prevalence variables – 
the index of intraparty institutional regulatedness, a poorly named dependent variable that 
sounds better abbreviated as IIIR. IIIR is computed as a simple proportion of active 
institutional categories in the total number of coding categories and indicates how much 
parties are formally constrained in what and how they do. Table 6 reports the values of IIIR, 
making parliamentary Spain appear on the whole much more constrained by the formal 
rules of party conduct than its presidential counterpart, Argentina. While for theoretical 
reasons only power concentrating rules can be properly viewed as constraints, here we 
compute IIIR with all rules, because we use it in conjunction with previously reported IIIC. 
We do not at present have a theoretical story for high levels of institutional regulation, thus 
no hypotheses to that end. This observation suggests the need to address the matter and 
further down the line expand the data to assess the theoretical implications. 
 
Table 5. Index of intra-party institutional regulation (fraction of coding categories that are 
active)  
   Parliamentary  Presidential  
Federal 
 
SMD 
 
Left  Australia .48   USA  .39 
Right   Australia .39   USA  .35 
PR 
 
Left  Spain  .83 Argentina .48 
Right Spain .74 Argentina .52 
Unitary 
 
SMD 
 
Left UK .43 - 
Right  UK .43 -  
PR 
 
Left  Norway  .39 Taiwan .57 
Right  Norway .35 Taiwan .57 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we take a baby step in the direction of presenting institutional design of party 
rules and regulations as a principal-agent situation with the potential for agency loss where 
there are substantial private goods components in the designers’ utility functions. Our 
initial effort at operationalizing the dependent variable have exposed both the difficulties 
and the possibilities and we see great promise in continuing on in developing both the 
theoretical and the statistical models of this process.   
Further research will need to address such questions as whether power-diffusion and 
power-concentration dimensions can be treated in combination (as we do here). Power 
diffusion institutions are mostly captured as practices and enabling rules (although some 
are strict regulations, such as media rationing, for instance). Practically all power-
concentrating institutions can be argued to be firm and binding constraints. Another 
empirical question of interest and great importance for supporting out theoretical claim is 
whether one finds a change in an institutional strategy by the elites whenever an outside 
  
party ascends to the parliamentary status, or a minor parliamentary party acquires the 
potential to become a ruling coalition member. 
  
  
APPENDIX 1: 
 
 
  
+ + Top-down transfers 
- - Bottom-up flow, voluntary 
+ + Bottom-up flow, mandatory 
- - Receipts and/or spending below the lowest el district level 
- - Does electoral Budget (or, as in US, Pacs) exist separately from party budget? 
+ + Government funds (to party in parliament) 
- - Government funds go to candidates (as opposed to central organization) 
+ + Tithing by candidates to the common party pot 
+ + Top controls registration of local organization 
+ + Government funds (to party in elections) 
+ + top can veto use of label 
- - Can there be independents in elections or parliament? 
- - Media access is rationed by law 
+ + Media rationing goes to top organization 
- - Do MPs have non-party offices and staff in parliaments? 
- - Do MPs have non-party budgets in parliament? 
+ + Do parties pay allowance to their MPs in parliament? 
+ + Factions allowed (1)/prohibited (1), else no entry 
- - Legislative primaries 
+ + Peak organizations donate or campaign directly 
- - Selection of PM/Pres separate from selecting party leader 
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